How Islam Makhachev

~ Defended the Crown ~

Within the first minute of Islam Makhachev versus Alexander Volkanovski II, Makhachev had thrown six left kicks, four to the body. It took him all of three minutes to turn this into a high kick that snuck over the featherweight champion’s guard and sent him to the mat for the technical knockout.

While the pre-fight hype package on the UFC broadcast had to invent some drama over the scoring of the original fight, the real appeal of this rematch was that both men had success where they should not have. Volkanovski’s chances were reckoned to be on the feet, and yet Makhachev often got the best of him there. Makhachev’s clinch and top game were supposed to be unstoppable and avoided at all costs, and Volkanovski held his own better than any natural lightweight there. Each man had things he could look at and learn from and try to bring to lever more in a second match up.

Makhachev’s left leg was an effective but obviously underused weapon in the first fight. In most of Makhachev’s fights his left leg is deployed often enough to be considered a signature look, but not abused as ruthlessly as it should be by someone with all his advantages in the clinch.  Furthermore by using front kicks to the body he could lower Volkanovski’s hands and begin to wear on the challenger’s gas tank, all while keeping his knee between Volkanovski’s body and his own. This mitigated some of the risk of Volkanovski charging up the inside that would exist on a round kick.

In addition to Makhachev’s own advantages, the southpaw left kicking game also seemed destined to be an issue for Volkanovski because he is so much about ducking and leaning to get around or under blows and close the distance. Once you start kicking on the open side, where Volkanovski’s lead shoulder cannot protect him and his right hand is so often busy in the act of attacking, the idea of a left high kick or knee coming up becomes even more dangerous. This was one of the reasons that many in the MMA community—this writer included—thought that Yair Rodriguez would be an especially stiff test for Volkanovski.

I must credit Ryan Wagner for spotting the same opening years earlier in Volknaovksi’s loss to Cory Nelson. Some of that was hand waved away with the fact that the fight was at welterweight, during Volkanovski’s descent from his mythical rugby weight. Yet you can clearly see the same issues of Volkanovski’s short stature, crouching into his stance, and the fact that he only has his hands in four ounce gloves to protect him.

Fig. 1

Another factor of the kicking game was that it never allowed Volkanovski to even get started. As a counter puncher, Makhachev was surprisingly effective in the first fight, but the nature of counter punching is that the other guy gets to go first. By trying to kick early and often, Makhachev’s gameplan made him fight more aggressively than he would perhaps choose to. Kicking requires you to be on the front foot, and to do it well you have to start kicking from outside of punching range. This meant that unlike the first fight, Makhachev immediately had Volkanovski back by the fence and worked well to keep him there.

The brevity of this fight was disappointing to those who sat through the rest of the UFC 294 circus and wanted another spirited, twenty-five-minute contest. But that is not to say that Volkanovski did not show adaptations of his own. In my pre-fight material, I returned to the idea of Volkanovski using the clinch along the cage to break and fire in flurries. In the course of this short bout he looked to be working towards that.

Let us examine the handfight. For a few years we’ve been talking about Islam Makhachev as the man to look at for fighting with your back to the fence. He had to do it every day in training as Khabib Nurmagomedov’s best lightweight training partner, it makes sense he knows a thing or two about the position. There is no one in the sport better on the overhook from this position right now.

Here’s a clip from @9h6st21 which shows the Makhachev Special. He did this to Oliveira, Lentz and Moises. Makhachev digs a surprisingly annoying little knee from his feet level overhook position, his opponent knees back and he throws them.

Fig. 2

The handfight that played out in this bout was a continuation of the handfight in the last bout. Figure 3 shows Volkanovski with his underhook and head position, and a forearm frame across Makhachev’s face (a). Makhachev seizes the wrist with an upward grip and forces it out of position (b), (c).

Fig. 3

Makhachev sneaks in one of his signature knees to the midsection (d), changing his grip to a biceps tie (e), which allows him to slide his hand down and capture a downward facing grip on the top of Volkanovski’s wrist (f). This is much better for his throws, continued kneeing, and for trying to angle out and grab a collar tie.

Fig. 4

Figure 5 shows Volkanovski sucessfully breaking away from this underhook pin. Framing on Makhachev’s jaw with his forearm (a), Volkanovski steps to his left and drops his right elbow, turning his palm towards him (b) (c). Turning his palm in allows his elbow to drop through the gap of Makhachevs overhook. Volkanovski ends up in a disengaged position, in exchanging range, with a frame across Makhachev’s face.

Fig. 5

This being the first time he pulled it off, just a couple of minutes in, he didn’t capitalize by striking. But breaking from cage clinches into striking flurries was something that worked for him against Hirota and Kennedy early in his UFC run, and something I had included in my hypothetical gameplan based on the clinch work of the first fight.

Figure 6 shows a further complication of the handfight, from the exchange before Figure 5 above. As Volkanovski limp arms free of the overhook, Makhachev clamps his armpit around the glove (d). Grabbing the back of Volkanovski’s head with his free arm, Makhachev scores a perfect knee (e), and lands in a double collar tie (f). Not only is Makhachev one of the best at using the double collar tie in MMA right now, it is a weapon that is especially well suited to fighting a shorter opponent.

Fig. 6

It was brief, it was bittersweet, but it was a good fight that still displayed the incredible level of the game being played.

Odds and Sods

Makhachev’s double collar tie work was part of a theme on this card: the dangers of keeping the head low. Before getting out-dawged in round three, Anshul Jubli had found great success kneeing Mike Breeden every time the American ducked down in a punching exchange. And Muin Gafurov demonstrated negative fight IQ by chasing Said Nurmagomedov to the fence and extending his neck into Nurmagomedov’s chest. Said Nurmagomedov is, of course, known for his power guillotine and promptly picked up the easiest win of his life.

Another theme of the night was misreading the opponent while kicking. Eric Cantona delivered a brilliant line in Netflix’s David Beckham documentary: he declared that the greatest footballers are mistaken for having intelligence when what they really have is anticipation. This is just as true for the great fighters. The most impressive techniques come off due to timing, and you can’t muscle or think your way around that. The worst blunders are often down to a misread of the opponent and an attempt to time something for which the opening just isn’t there.

Shara Magomedov seemed to have the read on Bruno Silva going into the second round, using his kicks and knee raises to create marching flurries. But in rounds two and three he made the same misread and was made to pay. Figure 7 shows how a knee raise will often work. Magomedov raises his left knee (b), Silva begins to retreat (c), and Magomedov hammers in the right low kick (d).

Fig. 7

If kicking is your stock and trade, marching behind knee raises can be extremely useful. And the worst thing a fighter can do when confronted with a marching opponent is to keep giving ground and allowing them to riff on ideas. Bruno Silva made the read though. Figure 8 shows the sequence that gave Silva an easy takedown in round two and round three. Magomedov raises his right knee (b), and steps through (c). As his weight comes down and he begins throwing a low kick with his left leg, Silva picks it up and runs through him into the takedown.

Fig. 8

There was much chuckling over Magomedov’s takedown defence after the match but most of it was his anticipation failing him and Bruno Silva’s own anticipation succeeding.

Another great example of a fighter’s anticipation failing them in the kicking game came from Muhammad Naimov. He attempted the “Cung Le Express”, stepping all the way through to the opposite stance before spinning. Here is Cung Le pulling it off.

Fig. 9

When Naimov attempted it against Nathaniel Wood, Wood didn’t step back or shell up, he stepped in and stuck to Naimov’s back like a limpet.

Fig. 10

Wood was on the receiving end of some rough officiating against Naimov, but on two occasions he was able to show his outside trip and score flawless takedowns.

Fig. 11

Having watched Wood hit almost a dozen of these in the last few years, this writer has only a couple of notes. The first is that the way Wood passes his opponent’s leg from trip to his hand is something that is easy to miss. Wood’s trips look so clean, but they often wouldn’t work if he didn’t chase his opponent down off them. This isn’t judo and leg grabs are very much in play.

The second note is that Wood seems to do best when hitting his trip off a slightly “longer” clinch. Obviously in a chest to chest clinch, opponents are alert to the idea that he wants to trip them. The moment he adds a little bit of space and threatens to open up a striking exchange, the trips come a bit easier. In the above example, Wood hits the trip from a collar tie, then a head post that allows him to throw uppercuts.

In Figure 12, Wood pummels his right hand over the top of Naimov’s underhook (a). This is a position where the right elbow over the top is now a real threat for Naimov, but Wood instead trips the leg (b) and follows up by catching it with his right hand (c), (d).

Fig. 12

Wood was also active with the broomstick. This is a mat return we discussed when examining Makhachev - Volkanovski I, because Volkanovski defended Makhachev’s mat returns by standing with his head to the fence and his butt to the centre of the cage. This made it impossible for Makhachev to put Volkanovski forward onto his hands. The broomstick is a mat return that takes the opponent backwards and might have been better suited for taking down Volkanovski.

Figure 13 shows Wood attempting it. He gets the back bodylock (a), and inserts his left foot as a hook, before latching it behind Naimov’s right knee (b). Wood sits his weight down and pulls Naimov backwards into his lap (c), but a fence grab prevents Naimov from falling (d).

Fig. 13

Naimov did follow up the blatant foul with some smooth technique though. Figure 14 shows him grabbing Wood’s left foot behind his knee (a). Wood sags his weight again (b) and Naimov high steps as he struggles to keep his balance (c). By high stepping and keeping hold of the foot, he is able to bring the foot up behind his buttock, where it is no longer blocking his ability to step backwards (d). Wood quickly abandoned the broomstick and moved on.

Fig. 14

In retrospect UFC 294 was a pretty terrible night of fights. Unpredictable and very funny if you’re a cynical old fight fan, but pretty terrible nonetheless. Even so, these moments of beautiful technique shone through.