How Dricus Du Plessis Defended the Crown

When the shambolic Dricus Du Plessis bumbled his way to a dominant stoppage victory over the master craftsman, Robert Whittaker back in July 2023, MMA afficionados were forced to take stock. Some were happy dismissing the result with a quick “look at the size of him”, but it seemed there was more going on. In Du Plessis vs Whittaker: Mechanics vs Tactics, I reasoned:

This writer’s takeaway from the fight was that it came down to mechanics versus tactics. Mechanics are the elements that a fighter brings into every fight. They are the movements trained into habits that only break down when a fighter is exhausted, hurt, or emotional. Tactics are choices made specifically within the context of a match up.

Robert Whittaker’s jab, one-two, and high kick are all slick and play off each other, but they are the weapons that he takes into every bout. His mechanics and brilliant control of distance ask a lot of tough questions of his opponents, but those questions remain fundamentally the same. Dricus du Plessis does not typically fight southpaw for much of the fight, doing so was a tactical choice he made solely for Robert Whittaker.

In studying Du Plessis’ subsequent fights I feel more confident than ever saying that Du Plessis is the middleweight division’s master tactician. The rematch with Sean Strickland at UFC 312 kept the same theme we discussed back in July 2023:  Sean Strickland’s sturdy defence and reliance on straight hitting and the teep ask difficult questions of any middleweight he fights… but those questions remain fundamentally the same.

Dricus Du Plessis gutted his way through twenty-five awful, awkward minutes with Sean Strickland the first time around and was blessed with a decision victory that few found impressive. The rematch was a complete contrast: everything troublesome about Strickland became inconsequential and as Du Plessis picked at the openings in Strickland that so many others never get to, Strickland looked helpless to change either the pace of the fight or the tactics he implemented.

Eliminating the Jab and Teep

As with any good gameplan, Du Plessis got to work taking away Strickland’s “A game”: the jab and the teep. The jab was nullified by Du Plessis’ high hands and constant checking of Strickland’s lead glove. At most points Du Plessis’s right palm was checking the path of Strickland’s jab, but often throughout the fight, Du Plessis would use a cross hand check—bringing his left hand across the centreline to check Strickland’s jabbing hand. This is a technique you do not see often, because it opens the path of the right hand, but that reflects the imbalance in Strickland’s game. Du Plessis could afford to overcommit to checking the jab, because Strickland would not adapt and make him pay for it.

Figure 1 shows the checking of hands that Du Plessis engaged in throughout the bout. The cross check is shown in frame (b), and the more more orthodox checking of the jab with the right hand is shown in frame (d).

Fig. 1

Just as important was Du Plessis’ choice to fight on the backfoot through the first three rounds. The first fight was characterized by Du Plessis jogging around the cage, before gritting his teeth to charge in swinging. This fight looked similar at points, but there was a lot more of Du Plessis drawing Strickland forward. This alone was enough to limit the effectiveness of Strickland’s two main weapons.

Du Plessis circling around the cage and retreating encouraged Strickland to step with his jab and commit to it, rather than just pumping it out from the arm as Du Plessis stepped in swinging. This allowed Du Plessis to parry the jab and then return with a punch or low kick, with little concern about running onto a right hand because of Strickland’s complete refusal to throw in combination. Figure 2 shows Strickland committing to stepping with his jab, Du Plessis parrying it, and Du Plessis returning with the same hand that performed the parry.

Fig. 2

Figure 3 shows the vulnerability created in Strickland’s lead leg when he commits to stepping into the jab. Du Plessis is able to parry the jab and return immediately with the calf kick, without Strickland having time to turn his shin out to check.

Fig. 3

The effectiveness of the teep is amplified many times by its use as an intercepting counter. You can also poke with it against a relatively stationary opponent, but it is one of the worst weapons to go chasing someone with. The fight was marked by an absence of teeps because Strickland rarely felt comfortable applying it. But when Strickland did try to teep moving forward, Du Plessis easily parried it, threw the calf kick as Strickland’s foot was falling to the mat.  In Figure 4, Strickland is actually able to turn his shin out to face the kick, though his foot is unweighted and Du Plessis doesn’t feel the affects of the check.

Fig. 4

With Strickland’s two best weapons neutralized, Du Plessis got to work picking at the stitching and trying to exploit the very obvious habit that Strickland has always shown: reaching. Strickland’s right hand is always drifting forward to check or parry his opponent’s lead hand and this leaves a giant space behind that hand on Strickland’s open side. Famously, Alex Pereira filled that space with a left hook. Pereira has one of the finest left hooks in MMA, but here is a forty-nine year old Ray Sefo playfully exploiting the same habit.

Fig. 5

Du Plessis is peculiar because he lunges in a way that his strikes seem to extend beyond where the should. You need only look at his fight with Israel Adesanya to see that. But Du Plessis runs through space, he does not really have that swift leaping left hook in his arsenal.  What he does have is a surprisingly dexterous left leg. So throughout this fight, Du Plessis’ left foot was constantly being thrown up with the intention of taking Strickland’s head off. Almost every time Du Plessis threw it, Strickland got away by the skin of his teeth, rather than by having anything substantial in the way of the kick.

Often Strickland ended up reaching for Du Plessis’ lead hand, registering the kick, and throwing his right forearm out vertically as if performing semaphore.

Fig. 6

This was then exploited by Du Plessis throwing a great many left kicks to the body underneath that block, and using question mark kicks from low to high and high to low.

Fig. 7

Du Plessis had used the lean back left kick as a counter to jabs against Israel Adesanya with limited success, but Strickland was tailor made for it. Eddie Futch famously found the flaw in Muhammad Ali’s jab: Ali’s right hand never went forward to intercept a possible jab from his opponent. So Futch had Kenny Norton jab with Ali, and palm Ali’s jab at the same time. Strickland has the opposite problem: he cannot jab without reaching for his opponent’s own left hand with his right. This meant that every time Strickland jabbed, Du Plessis could throw up a left high kick or body kick and even if he did not connect well, the target would normally be open.

Fig. 8

With Strickland always reaching for Du Plessis’ lead hand, and Du Plessis placing new emphasis on checking Strickland’s jab, the two often fell into the double handfight. This is a position you will see a great deal in Muay Thai, a little bit in MMA, and almost never in boxing. It is tying up both of your hands to smother both of your opponent’s. Punching out of the double hand fight is tricky and even when it works, it is often ugly.

Figure 9 shows a great example of Du Plessis working around the handfight which is both tactically sound and mechanically ugly. The two men check each other’s hands (a), and Du Plessis breaks away to circle off (b). As Strickland follows him and begins reaching to the double handfight, Du Plessis goes as if to throw his right hand but puts it over the top of Strickland’s left (c). As he throws his left shoulder forward, Du Plessis rips down Strickland’s left glove with his right hand, and punches his own left hand over the top of Strickland’s right (d). Continuing the right, left, right punching motion, he rips down Strickland’s right glove with his left hand, as he throws his free right hand over the top in his first legitimate punch of the flurry (e), (f).

Fig. 9

Another technique that Du Plessis used a couple of times to break the double hand fight was a shifting left hook. He would engage Strickland from a southpaw stance (b), touch hands (c), and step through to throw the left hook in an orthodox stance (d). This again attacked that gap behind Strickland’s reaching right hand. Du Plessis would always follow with the right straight (e).

Fig. 10

The southpaw jab is a facet of Du Plessis’ game that I am noticing more and more. In fact the southpaw jab in this fight demonstrates Du Plessis’ greatest strength: adaptability. Du Plessis always comes in with a whole pile of shit he intends to throw at the wall, but when something sticks, it becomes his fascination.

Du Plessis landed one southpaw jab, midway through round two. Then in round three, he threw four or five, and more in every round afterwards. It has always been a good trick for him: he will often shift backwards into a southpaw stance and then jab as the opponent steps forward to correct the distance (a Tony Ferguson favourite). But the southpaw is an example of Du Plessis’ succeeding because of his strange mechanics and not in spite of them.

Figure 11 shows a typical example of Du Plessis’ southpaw jab that sort of isn’t a jab. He can jab straight, he did it a few times in this fight. More often though, Du Plessis draws his lead hand all the way back, and then opens his elbow up above his shoulder to make a bizarre downward, arcing punch that has none of the tightness and purity of a hook and none of the directness of a straight. Instead this awkward, lunging punch passes over the top of his opponent’s jab or parry and nails them in the side of the head, even if they had the inside line.

Fig. 11

Many fans don’t want to be reminded, but Du Plessis buckled the legs of Rob Whittaker with this exact same elbow-up jab. In fact if you revisit the earliest pro fights of Prince Naseem Hamed, you will notice that this is one of his favourite punches as well.

Fig. 12

All of this is just the stuff that I felt made the most difference to the fight. A Du Plessis performance is also full of ideas that do not come to fruition. For instance, Du Plessis repeatedly switched to southpaw and immediately threw a back kick, never to much effect. He also used a low line side kick repeatedly to get over the top of Strickland’s light lead leg, and to bridge the gap and sneak in with a jab without getting caught up in the handfight, but he only used this a couple of times. Even the spinning backfist made an appearance—as a way of trying to make the most of running onto a teep or kicking himself out of position.

When Du Plessis defeated Whittaker, we discussed the idea of mechanics versus tactics. The more of Du Plessis I see, the more I become convinced that he is that ideal fighter I have written about for so long: not asking questions but finding answers. It has never been more obvious than in this second Strickland fight. Du Plessis struggled through the first twenty five minute bout, and then he and his team had thirteen months to go over what he experienced, and study that tape. Strickland is the typical question fighter: he came in with the same question he always raises and has troubled so many top middleweights. This time though, Du Plessis had the counter arguments, and for the first time since he began his middleweight campaign Sean Strickland was at a loss for words.